Killing the Killers summary

Iran has always sought to contain Sunni Muslims living in Iraq; Muslims in Iran are overwhelmingly Shia. In March 2015, it’s no different – to the Iranians, the Sunni ISIS terrorists are enemies. They’re less than pleased by the success of ISIS in establishing their caliphate on Iraqi soil, so it’s no surprise when Soleimani launches an attack with 20,000 Shia military fighters.

Tikrit has been controlled by ISIS since 2014. The city isn’t huge, but it’s significant, both symbolically and tactically. It was the birthplace of the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. And it lies on the banks of the Tigris, halfway between Baghdad to the south and Mosel to the north.

It’s 10:09 a.m., December 2, 2015. In Washington, DC, the threat from ISIS is being discussed by the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. Everyone in the room has been briefed about ISIS and al-Baghdadi. More than 1,200 people have been killed at their hands in terror attacks, not including thousands of casualties in Iraq and Syria.

Barely three weeks have passed since a campaign of attacks in Paris shocked the world. The attacks – at the Stade de France, at the Bataclan theater, and at other locations throughout the city – have left 130 innocent people dead.

In November 2017, Soleimani is writing to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, to confirm his strategic victory over ISIS in Syria. It’s not only a strategic victory, but also revenge for a humiliating attack by ISIS in the heart of the Iranian capital, Tehran.

Five months ago, a surprise attack by seven ISIS fighters resulted in 17 deaths and 43 injuries – the first such attack on Iranian soil.

It’s 9:15 p.m. on January 30, 2018. In Washington, President Trump is making his first State of the Union address. He has much to talk about. But around 40 minutes in, his attention switches to the war on terror. A year ago, he promised “the development of a new plan to defeat ISIS.” And his aggressive posture has been working.

In fact, ISIS has already lost 95 percent of its territory. But, in spite of that, attacks on American targets haven’t stopped.

It’s 7:20 p.m., December 27, 2019. Location: Kirkuk, Iraq. At Camp K-1, a joint Iraqi-US military base, dinner has just ended. Five-foot-long Katyusha rockets strike unexpectedly, primarily on the US side of the camp. Four US service members and two Iraqi security personnel are wounded and an American civilian contractor, Nawres Hamid, is killed.

There have already been eleven other rocket incidents since November, but, until now, nobody has been killed. It’s taken as an act of war. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reminds the Iranians that attacks orchestrated by them “will be answered with a decisive US response.”

It’s 12:32 a.m. on January 3, 2020. General Qasem Soleimani is sitting in the front row of an airbus A320 as it touches down at Baghdad International Airport in Iraq after its one-hour flight from the Syrian capital. He’s accompanied by two loyal Quds bodyguards and by two high-level Iranian officials. Soleimani trusts each of them implicitly.

They disembark and are met by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, founder of the Kataib Hezbollah militia. They drive away together in two SUVs. Soleimani believes he’s completely safe. But at that moment, the two cars are being followed from 20,000 feet by at least two MQ-9 Reaper drones.

A mass killer was dead. The Iranians protested, but their protest was muted. Demonstrations around the world soon turned to anger and disgust – at the US. It wasn’t long before Trump and the US were being portrayed as the villains.

News channels in the US aired programs where commentators gave differing viewpoints. Would it have been less dangerous to keep Soleimani alive? Did the benefits outweigh the risks?